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The Peloponnesian War, fought between Athens and
Sparta from 431 to 404 BC, pitted the two most powerful
Greek city-states against one another in a conflict that
has much to teach us about ancient warfare and mili-
tary strategy. In Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strate-
gies in the Peloponnesian War and Their Relevance To-
day, Athanassios Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos
seek to demonstrate that “although material conditions
may change, the logic of conflict between organised en-
tities remains constant throughout the millennia” (p. xi).
While not dismissing the historical value of Thucydides’
tome The History of the Peloponnesian War, they rank it
among the best pieces of strategic military analysis, to be
compared to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and Clausewitz’s
On War. The authors adhere to their goal in presenting
a tight, focused, and clear analysis of Thucydides’ under-
standing of grand strategy in the PeloponnesianWar; the
book will be especially useful to students of military his-
tory who already maintain a strong background in the
historical circumstances of the war.
The first chapter plays a definitory role, clearly sum-
marizing with historical examples various levels of mil-
itary strategy (e.g., offensive, defensive, compellent, de-
terrent) and tactics. The authors give a conceptual typol-
ogy of grand strategy (which they define as the way in
which states “ensure security”) to lay the foundation for
their focus on this aspect of Thucydides’ description of
the war between Athens and Sparta. Their definition of
“grand strategy” is inclusive, drawing together elements
of domestic and international legitimacy, diplomacy, and
military action. The second chapter is an extremely co-
gent review of the differences between the Athenian and
Spartan poleis, an introduction that sets the stage for the
conflict between the two city-states that formed the ba-
sis of Thucydides’ History. In chapters 3 and 4, the au-
thors present a clear case for understanding the grand
strategies of Athens and Sparta in the initial phases of
the war as quite opposite, with Athens (under the leader-
ship of Pericles) favoring a strategy of exhaustion and the
Spartans pursuing a strategy of annihilation to counter-
act what they perceived to be an unfavorable status quo.
Platias, who retains sole responsibility (according to the
preface) for the content of the third chapter, mounts a de-
fense of the Periclean grand strategy and Athenian naval
reliance. The author addresses various critiques of the
effectiveness of the Periclean policy, although one often
feels that the argument (carried also into the next chap-
ter) reads as an Athenocentric apologia and eschews any
counternarrative, with several important pieces on the
issue missing from the bibliography.[1]
Platias and Koliopoulos locate the turning point of
the war in the Athenian decision to invade Sicily in 415
BC (a classic case of “overextension”) and the intensifi-
cation of Persian monetary aid to the Spartan cause (p.
78). It was after this disaster that the Spartan army was
able to match its means to its intended end and shift the
balance of power to her side. The final chapter of the
book proposes that the application of the Thucydidean
model of grand strategy can serve as predictive of more
modern conflicts and appraises the use of the annihila-
tion and exhaustion strategies as a function of recent
international relations and technological developments.
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The last portion of the chapter highlights the Athenian
blunders in Sicily as the result of the underestimation
of the enemy, and the authors take the opportunity to
compare the disaster with more modern instances of the
same phenomenon. Throughout, the authors emphasize
the importance of perception (internal and external) to
the decision-making apparatuses of ancient and modern
warfare.
The authors contend that Thucydides, often studied
as the first international relations theorist, has not re-
ceived as much attention as he deserves for his contri-
bution to our understanding of ancient military strategy.
While their work is undoubtedly an important contribu-
tion to this field, it rather disturbingly fails to account for
several important previous contributions on the subject,
such as J. F. Lazenby’s The Peloponnesian War: A Mili-
tary Study (2004) and Theodore Tsakiris’s “Thucydides
and Strategy” (2006). Troubles also arise when one ap-
plies anachronistic terms to Thucydides’ work; the dan-
ger is clear when one browses the appendix on “Strate-
gic Concepts in Thucydides’ History,” where—although it
is acknowledged that Thucydides did not employ mod-
ern jargon—passages are taken out of context to prove
that our historian maintained an interest in grand strat-
egy. Such an exercise, if performed in the same way,
may also prove fruitful in a variety of other ancient
authors (Herodotus included). One constantly wavers
on a tightrope, whereby the application of Thucydidean
(non?)terminology to modern categorizations begins to
feel uncomfortably forced.
Although the authors contribute to our understand-
ing ofThucydides’ sophisticated conceptualization of the
Peloponnesian Wars, their work is best when consid-
ered in tandem with a study of contemporary (includ-
ingThucydidean) commentary on Greek cultural life and
mores and their profound differences from our own.
Thus, the book should be read in conjunction with a
full translation of Thucydides (recommended is Robert
Strassler’sThe LandmarkThucydides, 1998) and a modern
summary of the work (e.g., Lawrence Tritle, A New His-
tory of the PeloponnesianWar, 2010), as in many cases the
authors mention an issue essential to an understanding
of the war (e.g., The Melian affair, cited on p. 50) with no
further commentary. Ultimately, the work of Platias and
Koliopoulos is a helpful addition to our understanding of
Thucydides as a military strategist and to the outcome of
the great war between Athens and Sparta, although the
astute reader will want to compare its conclusions with
other contributions on the same topic.
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